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FALL 1960]
RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION-SUBSTITUTION OF PENALTY BY THE COURT.
Mitthauer v. Patterson (N.Y. 1960).
Petitioner, employed as a ticket seller by the New York City Transit
Authority, was dismissed from her position when she was found guilty
by the Authority of collecting fares and not registering them. She
brought proceedings under § 1283 et seq. of the New York Civil Prac-
tice Act' to annul or modify the dismissal, and the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed the determination of guilt,
but modified the Authority's decision by reducing the punishment from
dismissal to suspension for six months. Cross appeals were taken: peti-
tioner claimed there was insufficient competent evidence to sustain the
findings of guilt; the Authority claimed that the penalty of dismissal was
not excessive and should not have been reduced, that the Appellate Divi-
sion could not fix a new penalty, and finally, that a six-month suspension
was illegal. The New York Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting,
held that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of guilt, and
that modification by the appellate division in reducing the punishment
which it found excessive was not an abuse of discretion. Mitthauer v.
Patterson, 8 N.Y.2d 37, 201 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1960).
It is generally understood that employee removal and discipline are
almost entirely matters of executive agency discretion and so judicial
review thereof is greatly limited.2 In Miller v. United States3 the Seventh
Circuit granted a rehearing to resolve the question of the proper function
. 1. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT. § 1283 et seq. provided a detailed procedure for a
"Proceeding Against A Body or Officer." This is the common method by which
relief is sought in New York from administrative determinations. The Civil Service
Law was amended in 1941 to provide for review under this article as to appeals from
a determination of the Commission.
2. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES 265 (1959). Speaking of the Federal system, the court in
Hargett v. Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1957), noted that cases "after
the passage of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, make it clear
that employee removal and discipline are almost entirely matters of executive agency
discretion and that judicial review of such action is ordinarily available only to
determine if there has been substantial compliance with the pertinent statutory pro-
cedures ... so long as there is substantial compliance ... the administrative deter-
mination is not reviewable as to the wisdom or good judgment of the department
head in exercising his discretion."
3. 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958).
(89)
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of the court in proceedings to set aside an order of an administrative
agency fixing a penalty within the statutory limits. The court noted that
it had no right to change the penalty simply because the agency might
have imposed a different penalty. That the removal of a municipal em-
ployee by an administrative agency is an administrative function though
performed in a judicial manner was noted in a recent Minnesota case.4
The court used this argument to buttress the principal that a court may
not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency if the
administrative function is non-judicial. Ten years after the enactment of
the Administrative Procedure Act5 the California court in Bonham v.
McConnellO approved those cases which ordered a remand for reassess-
ment of the penalty where some of the material findings of the agency
were not supported by the weight of the evidence, and took the position
that if the unsupported charges were minor and the supported ones
major, the penalty should not be disturbed. 7 In an Illinois case similar
to the instant case8 the court said that the lower court had no power
to determine the extent of punishment, but rather could only weigh the
evidence to determine whether the findings of the Commission, with re-
spect to proof in support of the charges, were against the manifest weight
of the evidence. Important in the development of judicial reyiew of ad-
ministrative sanctions in New York is the case of Sagos v. O'Connell.9
The coisrt of appeals asserted that the reviewing court under Article 78,
Section 1296 of the Civil Practice Act could not consider the propriety of
the sanction imposed by an administrative agency where a statutory
violation was made the sole basis for such punishment.10 The doctrine
enunciated in Sagos" was applied in full in Barsky v. Board of Regents12
4. Sellin v. City of Duluth, 248 Minn. 333, 80 N.W.2d 67 (1956). See also,
Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1942).
5. Note CAL. CODS CIV. PROC. § 1094.5 (West 1954) : "(b) The inquiry in such a
case shall extend to whether . . .there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse
of discretion is established if respondent has not proceeded in the manner required
by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not
supported by the evidence. (e) ...where the judgment commanded that the order
or decision be set aside, it may order the reconsideration of the case in the light
of the court's opinion ...and may order respondent to take such further action as is
specially enjoined upon it by law, but the judgment shall not limit or control in any
way the discretion legally vested in the respondent"
6. 45 Cal.2d 304, 288 P.2d 502 (1955).
7. See 44 CALIF. L. Rev. 262, 288 for a review of the California controversy
over judicial review of penalties.
8. Nolting v. Civil Service Comm'n, 7 Ill. App. 2d 147, 129 N.E.2d 236 (1955).
9. 301 N.Y, 212, 93 N.E.2d 644 (1950). The court of appeals reversed a deci-
sion of the appellate division which had remitted the proceeding to the adminis-
trative agency for reconsideration of the extent of the punishment on the grounds
that it was excessive.
10. This decision caused one student of administrative law to note that such
limitation on the courts would grant only a "skeletonized form of review" particu-
larly in view of the fact that the sanction contributes "the very warp and woof of the
administrative proceeding.'" Schwartz, 1950-1951 Survey of New York Law - Ad-
ministrative Law, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 773, 780 (1951).
11. Sagos v. O'Connell, 301 N.Y. 212, 93 N.E.2d 644 (1950).
12. 305 N.Y. 89, 111 N.E.2d 222 (1953).
[VOL. 6
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where the court said in reply to assertions that the Regents dealt too
harshly with the appellants: "it is enough to say that we are wholly with-
out jurisdiction to review such questions."13 To fill this lacuna in the
law of judicial review an amendment was made to Section 1296 of the
Civil Practice Act which empowered the courts to decide whether the
administrative agency had abused its discretion in the imposition of the
penalty.' 4 Since the passage of this amendment, there have been many
cases in which the court felt that the punishment was excessive and then
remitted the proceedings to the administrative agency for reconsideration
of the penalty. 15 However, the instant case appears to be the first time
the court has not only found the discipline excessive, but thereupon sub-
stituted its own penalty without permitting the agency to reconsider.
The court in the instant case approved the criterion used by the
appellate division, third department, in Stolz v. Board of Regents 6 to
determine whether the Authority abused its discretion under subdivision
5-a, that is, whether the measure of punishment is so disproportionate to
the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to shock one's sense
of fairness.' 7 It was the fact that the petitioner had over twenty years ser-
vice and would lose valuable rights if dismissed that prompted the majority
in the instant case to conclude that the penalty was excessive, but it
would appear that since the petitioner was in a position of trust, the
discipline was perhaps not so excessive as to warrant judicial inter-
vention.' 8 The court indicates that it has complete power in the course of
its judicial inquiry in determining abuse of discretion and so "can order
a lesser discipline, much as it does in criminal cases." 19 By so doing, the
court feels it can avoid the circumlocution involved in remitting to the
Authority. The intent of the legislature would seem to have been to
afford some measure of protection to the individual against arbitrary
and capricious action 20 but not to relinguish to the court the agency's
discretionary power.2' Even where the federal courts have the power to
13. Id. at 99, 111 N.E.2d at 226.
14. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. AcT. § 1296 (5-a), which listed an additional issue-to be
passed on by the courts: "Whether the respondent abused his discretion in imposing
the measure of punishment or penalty or discipline involved in the determination."
15. Pitt v. Town Board of the Town of Ramapo, 201 N.Y.S.2d 947 (App. Div.
1960) ; Delventura v. Hayes, 8 App. Div. 2d 730, 187 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1959) ; Triple Inn
v. Kennedy, 3 App. Div. 2d 907, 162 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1957); Rodriguez v. Rohan, 3
App. Div. 2d 648, 158 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1957).
16. 4 App. Div. 2d 361, 165 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1957).
17. Id. at 364, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
18. In as much as it spends a great deal of time on personal problems, it would
seem that the Authority might have been better qualified than the court to exercise
discretion on problems of personnel management. 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 185 (1958).
19. Mitthauer v. Patterson, 8 N.Y.2d 37, 201 N.Y.S.2d 321, 324 (1960).
20. See McKINNzY'S SESSION LAWS OF 1955 at 1650 where the Governor in a
statement approving the amendment said: "There is no means for judicial review of
penalties imposed by an administrative agency. This leaves without remedy one who
suffers as a result of an excessive penalty."
21. See Stolz v. Board of Regents 4 App. Div. 2d 361, 165 N.Y.S.2d 179
(1957) at 182, where the court said: "Obviously the words abuse of discretion can-
FALL 1960]
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modify, in addition to affirming or setting aside a determination, the
courts refuse to substitute their judgment for that of the agency.22 When
making the analogy to the substitution of judgment in criminal cases, the
majority seems to disregard the difference in the relation between a trial
court and an appellate court on the one hand, and an administrative agency
and the reviewing court, on the other.23 In particular, the analogy to the
criminal cases is unconvincing because in criminal cases the court is
permitted to reduce a sentence to one not lighter than the minimum penalty
provided by the law for the offense of which the defendant was convicted.2 4
There is relatively less discretion involved in applying penalties in a
criminal case, whereas the Authority in the instant case had a wide range
of punishments-not relating to specific offenses - in its arsenal from
which to choose.25 In disregarding the residuum of discretion remaining
with the Authority, the court appears to have usurped the power of the
agency, as the price for avoiding circumlocution. 26 Even if the court had
not reasonably be given so broad an interpretation as to allow the courts to sub-
stitute their judgment, as to the appropriate measure of discipline, for that of the
administrative agency. If that were done, the power of administration would, to a
large extent, be transferred from the administrative agency to the courts since the
measure of punishment or discipline is often the heart of the determination." In
Leavitt v. Board of Regents, 9 App. Div. 2d 987, 194 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (1959),
the court noted that while it has "power to review the measure of discipline . . . the
power should be exercised sparingly, 'and we may not substitute our judgment for
that of the administrative agency." See also McGinnis' Broadway Restaurant v.
Rohan, 6 App. Div 2d 115, 175 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1958) where the court noted that
the special term was not empowered to dictate what a proper punishment should be.
22. In the concurring opinion of Judge Finnegan in Miller v. United States,
260 F.2d 286, 300 (7th Cir. 1958), it was noted that 6(B) of the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 72 stat. 944 (1958), 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1959), allows the reviewing court to
"modify" in addition to affirm or set aside. But it was said that "modify" simply
enabled a reviewing court to send back an order for further administrative action.
"There is nothing in 6(B) indicating that the scope of judicial review has been
enlarged to the point where periods of suspension, for example, can be either increased
or decreased, or that revocations can be converted into suspensions." In Federal
Power Comm'n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952), the court said "that
authority [to affirm, modify or set aside] is not power to exercise an essentially
administrative function."
23. In FCC v. Pottsville, 309 U.S. 134, 144 (1940), the court noted that "to
assimilate the relation of these administrative bodies and the courts to the rela-
tionship between lower and upper courts is to disregard the origin and purpose of the
movement for administrative regulations and at the same time to disregard the
traditional scope, however far-reaching, of the judicial process. Unless these vital
differentiations between the functions . . . are observed, courts will stray their
province ......
24. The court may at its discretion reduce the sentence when the punishment
for the crime was reduced by the legislature after the conviction, People v. Spagnolia,
260 App. Div. 551, 23 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1940). Also the appellate division has juris-
diction to extend mercy to a defendant by a reduction of the sentence within the
limits set by 543(1) of the Criminal Code, to a sentence not lighter than the minimum
provided by law for the offense, People v. Potskowski, 298 N.Y. 299, 83 N.E.2d
125 (1948).
25. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAWS § 75(3): "the penalty or punishment may consist of
a reprimand, a fine not to exceed one hundred dollars to be deducted from the
salary or wages of such officer or employee, suspension without pay for a period
not exceeding two months, demotion in grade and title, or dismissal from the
service."
26. Yet there was no cry of circumlocution when the appellate division in
Rodriguez v. Rohan, 3 App. Div. 2d 648, 158 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1957) held the punish-
[VOL. 6
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remitted the proceedings, the Authority would not legally have been per-
mitted to render a discipline of six months suspension, since the maximum
suspension provided by law was two months.2 7 It is unfortunate that the
court saw fit to execute that which the Authority was powerless to do.
The court appears to have assumed its function to be charismatic and to
have taken on the character of a supercommission.
Arthur T. Downey
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-PRODUCT OF
UNREASONABLE SEARCH BY STATE OFFICERS INADMISSIBLE IN
FEDERAL COURTS.
Elkins v. United States (U.S. 1960).
Petitioners were indicted in the United States District Court in Oregon
for the offense of intercepting and divulging telephone communications,
and of conspiracy to do so, in violation of federal law.' Before trial
petitioners made a motion to suppress as evidence several tape and wire
recordings and a recording machine which had originally been seized by
state law enforcement officers in the home of one of the petitioners under
circumstances which, two Oregon courts had found, had rendered the
search and seizure unlawful. 2 The district court admitted the articles in
question, disregarding the question of the reasonableness of the search,
because there was no evidence that any agent of the United States was
aware that the search was being contemplated or was eventually made by
state officers, and the petitioners were convicted. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of
the United States, with four justices dissenting, reversed and held that
evidence obtained by state officers during a search which, if conducted by
federal officers, would have violated defendant's immunity from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment, is inadmissible
over the defendant's timely objection in a federal criminal trial. Elkins
v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437 (1960).
ment of ten day suspension excessive and yet remitted the proceedings to the State
Liquor Authority for reconsideration. Certainly the discretion left to the Authority
there was more narrow than in the instant case.
27. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAWS § 75(3): "the penalty or punishment may consist
of .. . suspension without pay for a period not exceeding two months . . ..
1. 48 Stat. 1100 (1954), 47 U.S.C. §§ 501, 605 (1958) ; 18 U.S.C. 371 (1958).
2. The state officers had procured a search warrant based upon "information
and belief" that one of petitioners possessed obscene motion pictures and accom-
panying sound recordings. The search did not reveal such materials, but para-
phernalia believed to be used in making wiretaps were found and seized.
FALL 1960]
5
Editors: Recent Decisions
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1960
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
At common law and in the United States, the general rule had al-
ways been that relevant evidence was admissible in a court of law despite
the fact it had been procured in an illegal manner.8 The fourth amend-
ment had always forbidden unreasonable searches and seizures by federal
officers, but it was not until Weeks v. United States4 that the Supreme
Court decided evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment, should
be excluded in federal courts. The Weeks case seemingly recognized
a need to restrain the federal courts from becoming a party to govern-
mental violation of the Constitution by allowing the products of such
official lawlessness in a judicial proceeding. In addition it was felt that
exclusion of the evidence was the only effective means of enforcing rights
secured by the fourth amendment. 5 As illegal searches and seizures by
state officials did not violate the fourth amendment, which applied only
to federal conduct, the same Court declared evidence illegally seized by
state officials to be admissible in a federal court. 6 In the ensuing deci-
sions in which the exclusionary rule of the Weeks case was applied, the
Court's primary concern was with the determination of when the unlawful
search and seizure might be attributed to federal officers 7 and when it
might not.8 However, on the same day one such case was decided, Lustig
v. United States,9 Wolf v. Colorado'° was handed down. There the Court
held that the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," and thus was a
protection guaranteed against the states by the fourteenth amendment.
However, the Court added that it did not follow that the Constitution
required state courts to exclude such evidence, as the means to enforce this
constitutional right were to be left to the states. Therefore the Weeks
rationale, that evidence illegally seized by state officers need not be ex-
cluded in federal court because there was no constitutional violation, was
no longer valid after Wolf.
In the Weeks decision, the Court had supported their exclusionary
rule on the basis that the fourth amendment requires such a rule to secure
3. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); 8 WIrMORt, EVIDrNCn § 2183
(3d ed. 1940).
4. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. Id. at 392, 393.
6. Id. at 398.
7. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 310 (1927), where there was actual
participation by federal officers; Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927),
where state officers acted solely in behalf of federal officers; Sutherland v. United
States, 92 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1937), where state officials acted pursuant to a
plan of cooperation between federal and state officers.
8. See Burdeau v. MacDonald, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), where the evidence was
gathered by private individuals; United States v. Lefkowitz, 52 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.
1931), where the evidence was offered against one other than the victim.
9. 338 U.S. 74 (1949). This case restates the federal participation rule an-
nounced in Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 310 (1927). However, the rule now
became known as the silver platter doctrine, deriving its title from Justice Frank-
furter's declaration that evidence illegally seized by state authorities is admissible
in the federal court if presented to federal authorities on a silver platter.
10. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
[VOL. 6
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its effective enforcement. In the instant case, the Court did not search for
such a constitutional mandate, nor need they have. The Court has always
formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal prosecutions, and has
invoked its supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice
without challenge." In the instant case it determined that considerations
of healthy federalism and of judicial integrity necessitated that an ex-
clusionary rule be applied to illegally seized state evidence.' 2 The Court
invoked its supervisory power, and excluded from federal prosecutions
all evidence seized by state officers "during a search which, if conducted by
federal officers, would have violated the defendant's immunity from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment."' 3
The test enunciated by the Court was that of the fourth amendment.
This seems to indicate that the majority thought the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the fourth amendment in its
entirety. 14 "The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one
state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may
have colorably suppressed."' 5 Therefore, the federal courts are to apply
the new exclusionary rule without regard to the norms of any state
court. As a result, if a state has more stringent standards of admis-
sibility than the fourth amendment test to be now imposed by the federal
courts, they would be ignored. States may, and some do, have more rigid
norms'" than those of the fourth amendment. Rules relating to the ad-
missibility of blood tests,' 7 to searches incident to a lawful arrest,' 8 or as to
11. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 339 (1943).
12. The Court also spoke of the deterrent effect which the exclusionary rule
would have on state officials, but a discussion of this point is beyond the scope of
this note.
13. Elkins v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1447 (1960). A recent case,
James v. United States, 280 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1960), suggests there will be
problems in applying the rule of the instant case. There defendant was convicted
in federal court of possession of an unregistered firearm, but the gun had been
obtained by state officers in a search incident to an arrest by state officers for
disturbing the peace, a misdemeanor which had not taken place in their presence.
The court of appeals, in overturning the conviction, merely noted that the federal
arrest statutes would not have allowed an arrest in this situation. Apparently the
Elkins test is here interpreted to require that the search be incident to an arrest
which would be legal under federal arrest statutes. This poses a significant problem,
as some states have arrest statutes, apparently constitutional, which differ from
the federal arrest statutes. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 954.03(1) (1959).
14. The majority did not expressly state this to be so, but in his dissent in the
instant case Justice Frankfurter says that apparently the Court is equating the
scope of the fourteenth amendment with the scope of the fourth. In a later
opinion, Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 80 Sup. Ct. 1463 (1960), four members of the
majority in Elkins indicated that the fourteenth amendment was to be equated with
the fourth. An alternative explanation is, however, possible. It may be that, since
it was fashioning only a rule of evidence, the court decided to select a test more
familiar and well defined than that of "due process."
15. Elkins v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1447 (1960).
16. Although technically two norms may exist in a state, in the form required
by the state court through its exclusionary rules, and that required by the legislature,
what is referred to here is the norm of the state court, because it makes the
ultimate determination on questions relating to the use of evidence.
17. Compare Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 with Lebel v. Swincicki, 354
Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958).
18. State v. Adams, 103 W. Va. 77, 136 S.E. 703 (1927).
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what constitutes probable cause for an arrest without a warrant, 19 are
concrete examples. Consequently, it may be concluded that the effort
of the states to prevent their officials from making use of wrongfully
seized evidence, will not always be respected by the newly promulgated
exclusionary rule.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the instant case, sought a modifi-
cation of the Weeks doctrine at it related to state seized evidence, rather
than its reversal. He would assure a harmonious relationship between
state and federal court determinations by looking to the individual state
courts to ascertain what norms and sanctions they would apply by way
of exclusion. Whether they would admit the evidence in question, or
exclude it, the federal courts would follow suit. Justice Frankfurter's rule
would seem to require exclusion on a constitutional basis only in those
few situations where the evidence has been so violently seized that its
admission in a state court would offend "due process" requirements.
2 0
But this rule also misses the mark. Comity would certainly be assured,
for the federal courts would be looking to the state courts for their cue.
However, the judicial integrity of the federal courts would continue to be
violated, for unconstitutionally seized evidence would empty into the
federal courts from states which do not have an exclusionary rule, or from
states which have an exclusionary rule, but apply it loosely.
The majority test in the instant case would preserve the integrity
of federal courts, but state-federal comity would be violated. Justice
Frankfurter's test, espoused in his dissent in the instant case, fully pro-
tects state-federal comity, but does so at the expense of the federal court's
integrity. There would seem to be a third possible solution, whereby both
state-federal comity and the court's integrity can be preserved. Such
a solution is premised on the fact that there is a justifiable reason for
violating state-federal relationships, in refusing to admit evidence from
state officials whose acts do not measure up to federal standards. The
federal courts must police their own tribunals, and as the Mc'Nabb case
announced, it has the complete right to do so. The federal courts should
not be required to lower their standards, standards which are constantly
before the critical public eye, to accommodate the whims of the state.
"The effectiveness of courts must always depend in large measure upon
the respect which their processes commend by reason of the integrity they
reveal."' 21 It is suggested on the other hand, that it is not too demanding
to request federal courts to raise their standards when state requirements
are stricter than those which the fourth amendment would impose. By the
federal courts raising their admissibility standards comity would be as-
sured, and judicial integrity would not be sacrificed, but raised to loftier
standards. Moreover, state protection of civil liberties would be encouraged.
19. People v. Thymiakas, 140 Cal. App. 2d 940, 296 P.2d 4 (1956).
20. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
21. Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
[VOL. 6
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Therefore, a compromise test is proposed. Evidence seized by state officers
ought not be admitted in federal courts whenever either the fourth amend-
ment test, enunciated in the instant case, would be violated or the stricter
standards of the state would be infringed. If such stricter standards are
not in effect, the courts would under this test, apply the fourth amend-
ment test of the instant case.
John V. Hasson
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY-HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE LEGALLY
CAPABLE OF CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
United States v. Dege (U.S. 1960).
Defendants, husband and wife, were charged with conspiracy to
commit an offense against the United States in violation of the Federal
Conspiracy Statute.' The bill of indictment, which alleged that defend-
ants conspired to smuggle 2 goods into the United States, was dismissed by
the District Court for the Southern District of California on the ground
that it did not state an indictable offense. The court based its dismissal
on the assertion that a husband and wife are incapable of conspiring in
the legal sense. On direct appeal the United States Supreme Court re-
versed, with three Justices dissenting, holding that husband and wife
are within the scope of the Conspiracy Statute, and that prior decisions to
the contrary were simply following the archaic principles of the common
law. United States v. Dege, 80 Sup. Ct. 1589 (1960).
At common law the offense of conspiracy between spouses did not
exist, 3 due to the theory that husband and wife became one by marriage,
and that the legal existence of the woman became merged with that of her
husband. In this country, the earlier decisions of many state courts fol-
lowed this general common law doctrine.4 That "it was not legally possi-
ble for husband and wife to conspire" under a federal statute was first
decided as early as 1926 in Dawson v. United States,5 and that case has
1. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948). "If two or more persons conspire either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof, in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons
do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy ...
2. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1948).
3. Williams, Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 MOD. L. REv. 20 (1947).
4. Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 Pa. County Ct. 65 (1900). "As husband and
wife, the defendants could not conspire together, therefore the indictment charged no
offense, and the defendants have never been in jeopardy." Accord, People v. Miller,
82 Cal. 107, 22 Pac. 934 (1889) ; State v. Clark, 14 Del. (9 Harr.) 536, 33 Atl.
310 (1891); Jones v. Monson, 137 Wis. 478, 119 N.W. 179 (1909).
5. 10 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1926).
FALL 1960]
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been strong precedent in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere.6 A present-day
rationale for the principle is almost non-existent in the decisions, for the
respective courts have grounded their opinions on such basic phrases as
"it has been uniformly held,"7 and there is "no authority to the contrary."
Rejecting this contention, a number of state courts have held that the
fiction of the merged identity of husband and wife has lost much, if
not all, of its vitality in modern day America.9 The United States District
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has directly repudiated the
common law contention that there could be no conspiracy between spouses,
stressing that in modern law husband and wife are considered legally
separate in such divergent fields as property, contracts, and torts.'0 That
court also attempted to show that logically such a fiction was simply not in
tune with reality, nor fitted to our present-day concept of law." Recent
federal cases12 have been more inclined to follow this view than that
expounding the common law principle.
In delivering the opinion for the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has based the decision on the necessity of ridding modern legal
thinking of outmoded and antiquated fictions. 18 In viewing a doctrine of
this type, the primary question poses the issue of whether present-day
policy considerations demand the retention of the theory, or whether it
must stand alone on the merits of its long continued existence. It is the
most obvious truism to say that the status of women has changed radically
since the "unity concept" was first promulgated. In virtually every realm
of legal thinking, the courts and legislatures have done away with "well
established" doctrines, based on the "unity concept" of the common law.14
These trends are realistic evidence of the desire on the part of our law-
6. Gros v. United States, 138 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1943); United States v.
Shaddix, 43 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Miss. 1942). Both cases cited Dawson v. United
States, supra note 5.
7. Dawson v. United States, 10 F.2d 106, 107 (9th Cir. 1926).
8. United States v. Sh4ddix, 43 F. Supp. at 300.
9. Dalton v. People, 68.Colo. 44, 189 Pac. 37 (1920); People v. Martin, 4 Ill.
App. 2d 105, 122 N.E.2d 245 (1954); Marks v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 509, 164
S.W.2d 245 (1942).
10. Johnson v. United States, 157 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
11. Id. at 209, "No reason remains why the law should not recognize the ob-
vious fact that the relation of husband and wife does not prevent two persons
from conspiring to commit an offense."
12. Wright v. United States, 243 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1957); Thompson v. United
States, 227 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1946).
13. United States v. Dege, 80 Sup. Ct. 1589, 1590 (1960). "... and therefore
do not allow ourselves to be obfuscated by medieval views regarding the legal status
of women, and the common law reflection of them."
14. Because of "Married Women's Property Acts", which enable a married
woman to acquire, hold, and sell personal property, as if she were unmarried, many
state courts have even done away with one of the best established of common law
theories, i.e., one spouse could not commit larceny against the property of the other.
Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc., 221 Ind. App. 47, 46 N.E.2d 243 (1943) ; State v.
Koontz, 124 Kan. App. 216, 257 Pac. 944 (1927). But some courts, however, have
rejected this view, holding that the concept of common property in marriage is
too strong to find larceny between spouses.
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makers to do away with the basic concept from which flows that amor-
phous "oneness," whereby two persons obviously guilty of conspiracy are
free from prosecution simply because of their marital status.1 5 The minority
feels that to remove this defense is not only contrary to a rule well
established in the common law,1 6 but also a merciless stroke against the
solemn serenity of cojugal bliss. They premise this belief on the theory
that a wife simply by virtue of the intimate life she shares with her hus-
band, might easily perform acts that would technically be sufficient to
involve her in a criminal conspiracy with him.' They also express con-
cern that possible conviction of "technical conspiracy" presents too great
a risk to the American conception of the confidential relationship of mar-
riage. However, such a position would seem to ignore completely the
definition supplied by the many federal courts, of the precise nature of
the crime of conspiracy, which virtually rules out any conviction simply
on the basis of marital confidences.' 8 If two people carry out all other
requirements for a conviction on conspiracy charges, without any showing
of the application of coercion, the simple fact that they are man and
wife should not preclude that conviction.
Nothwithstanding these strong policy reasons against retention of
the rule it must be borne in mind that in the instant case the Court was
interpreting a criminal statute. Chief Justice Warren puts great weight
on the contention that when the original Conspiracy Statute was passed
in 1867, the common law principle was held in high regard. Following
from this undoubtedly true fact, he seeks the conclusion that since the 1948
legislation 19 re-enacted the old statute without material variation, Congress
intended the same exact conclusions of law should flow from the new as from
the old. This minority view seems to rest upon the so-called "re-enactment
rule." The rule held that where the legislature re-enacts a statute with
substantially the same wording as a previous one, a presumption is
created of legislative adoption of previous judicial interpretation of that
statute. This rule was, for all practical purposes, done away with in
15. United States v. Dege, 80 Sup. Ct. 1589, at 1590 (1960). "Considering that
legitimate enterprises between husband and wife have long been commonplace, it
would enthrone an unreality into the law to suggest that man and wife are legally
incapable of engaging in illicit enterprises and therefore, forsooth, do not engage in
them."
16. Id. at 1592.
17. Id. at 1593.
18. "The elements of a criminal conspiracy are an object to be accomplished; a
plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object; an agreement or under-
standing between two or more of the defendants whereby they become definitely
committed to co-operate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied
in the agreement. . . ." Pinkerton v. United States, 145 F.2d 252, 254 (5th -ir.
1944). (Emphasis added.) Accord, United States v. Hutts, 256 U.S. 524 (1921);
United States v. Frisbie, 157 U.S. 60 (1886) ; United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d
290 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Sprague v. Aderholt, 45 F.2d 790 (D.C. Ga. 1930).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948).
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Girouard v. United States.20 Moreover, even the original rule would have
had little effect on the present case, for the prerequisite for its use was a
prior well settled judicial interpretation. 21  Such was not the case in
1948,22 and since there was no other legislative history on the subject,
it would seem that this case was in the legitimate area where judicial
interpretation was not only permissable but necessary. 23 Congress had
passed a statute which dealt in general terms with the crime of conspiracy,
and in view of the split by the lower federal courts, the question was open
as to how it should be applied to a husband and wife.24 The Supreme Court
was faced with the decision and of necessity had to weigh the merits of
the common law rule in its relation to modern enforcement of the statute.25
In view of the policy decisions implicit in the question, the Court would
seem to have been correct in imputing to Congress the intention to punish
any and all perpetrators of conspiracy against the United States, re-
gardless of the marital status of such conspirators. 2 6
Robert J. Bray, Jr.
20. 328 U.S. 428 (1941). It was held that re-enactment after prior judicial in-
terpretation was merely an aid to statutory construction. Accord, Helvering v.
Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1941); Commonwealth v. Broadcasting System, 311 U.S.
132 (1940).
21. United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540 (1938) ; Heald v. District of Columbia,
254 U.S. 20 (1920) ; H. Hirchfield & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442 (1905).
22. See supra notes 6 and 12.
23. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in a highly regarded article that "In those
realms where judges directly formulate law because the chosen lawmakers have
not specifically acted, they have the duty of adaption and adjustment of old prin-
ciples to new conditions." Frankfurter, Some reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. Riv. 527, 535 (1947). See generally: Frank, Some Remarks on
Statutory Interpretation, 47 CoLum. L. Rrv. 1259 (1947) ; Jaffe, An Essay on
Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 CoLUm. L. Riv. 359 (1947).
24. The logic and necessity for embarking on such an inquiry was well stated by
Justice Holmes when he said that "We agree to all the generalities about not supply-
ing criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as what they obviously mean". Roschen v. Ward, 299
U.S. 337, 339 (1929).
25. "When the legislature uses words which by their nature leave to the courts
the job of applying broad vague standards, it is a mistake to suppose that courts are
never called upon to appraise and balance the value of opposed interests and to en-
force their preference." Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Associated Press,
52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
26. "Such an immunity to husband and wife as a pair of conspirators would
have to attribute to Congress one of two assumptions: either that responsibility of
husband and wife for joint participation in a criminal enterprise would make for
marital disharmony or that a wife must be presumed to act under the coercive in-
fluence of her husband and, therefore cannot be a willing participant. The former
assumption is unnourished by sense; the latter implies a view of American woman-
hood offensive to the ethos of our society." United States v. Dege, 80 Sup. Ct. 1589,
1591 (1960). One objection that has been raised to a courts extending the applica-
tion of a criminal statute to a situation heretofore thought not to be covered by it is
that this involves the evils of ex post facto legislation. The obvious answer to this
contention is that the court is merely declaring what the law has always been under
the statute in question. See Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1960).
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FEDERAL JURISDICTION-DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP-APPLICA-
TION OF UNIFORM NATIONAL LAW IN ACTION BY ADMIRALTY
PROCTOR FOR CONTRACT INTERFERENCE.
Greenberg v. Panama Transport Co. (D. Mass. 1960).
Plaintiff's client, Vazquez, a Spanish citizen, was injured while
working as a seaman aboard a vessel owned by the defendant corpora-
tion, a wholly owned subsidiary of co-defendant Esso TANKERS, INC.
Under his employment contract, Vazquez was entitled to disability pay-
ments for injury and an award for permanent partial disability. How-
ever, while in a Maine hospital, Vazquez chose to retain plaintiff as coun-
sel and there executed a document to that effect.1 A representative of
Esso Tankers, knowing that plaintiff had been engaged as attorney and
had filed suit against defendants in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York, went to Maine where he attempted to persuade
Vazquez to discharge plaintiff and settle with the company upon the
terms of the employment contract. It was alleged that at that time, as
well as in a subsequent letter to Vazquez from defendant's employment
agent, assertions were made that attorneys in the United States did not
correctly handle seamen's claims and did not care for the future of the
person involved. Two months later, Vazquez dismissed plaintiff and
left the United States for Spain; his flight was paid for by the defend-
ants. Plaintiff brought this action for damages resulting from defend-
ants' interference with an advantageous contractual relation claiming
jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship. The district court, Judge
Wyzanski presiding, ruled that despite the fact that this case was pre-
sented as one within the court's diversity jurisdiction, the questions of law
were governed by neither the internal law nor the conflict of laws rules of
Massachusetts. In concluding the contract between plaintiff and his
client was a valid retainer and defendants had tortiously interfered with
that contract, the court applied uniform national law. Greenberg v.
Panama Transport Co., 185 F. Supp. 320 (D. Mass. 1960).
Since the case of Szwift v. Tyson2 was superseded by Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins,3 it has been generally accepted that in an action in a federal
court based on diversity of citizenship, the substantive law to be applied
is the law of the state in which the court sits. This rule extends to
encompass the field of conflict of laws.4 However, it cannot be over-
1. The contract read in part: ". . . For such services rendered, I agree to
pay my said attorney a fee not to exceed services rendered. I agree to pay my said
attorney a fee not to exceed one-third of any amount collected by way of court ver-
dict or settlement."
2. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. The Supreme Court has held that the District Court of Delaware, sitting
in diversity, was compelled to apply that state's law concerning foreign contracts.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Accord, Griffin v.
McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
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looked that there have been situations where Erie has been held not to
apply. Two of these cases, O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,'
and Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,6 are cited by Judge
Wyzanski as authority for his determination that state law does not
automatically apply in the instant case. In the former, it was determined
that certain fields are still governed by a federal common law which
should be tapped in determining the privilege of defendant in trans-
mitting a libellous message, since Congress had occupied the field by pro-
viding a "fairly comprehensive scheme of regulation."'7 In the latter case,
the Supreme Court held that since state law cannot be allowed to abrogate a
federal statute, defendant in a suit for violation of a patent licensing
agreement could base a counterclaim on the Sherman Act even though
state law would have estopped him from so doing.8 In American Surety
Co. v. First Nat. Bank,9 it was held that a federal court could fashion a
federal rule of law to determine a bank's liability for a deposit of bank-
ruptcy funds. Maritime issues also stand in an area not governed by
the Erie rule, since general rules of maritime law have always been
applicable to rights arising in that field, whether the action is brought in
admiralty or law court.' 0 In Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping Co.," a post
Erie action for a maritime tort, the court applied federal maritime law,
reasoning that although jurisdiction was founded solely upon diversity,
this was a field largely entrusted, under the Constitution, 1 2 to federal rules
for the purpose of uniformity.13 Such cases, however, do not appear to
be direct authority for the instant case.' 4
5. 113 F.2d 539 (lst Cir. 1940).
.6. 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
7. 113 F.2d 539, 541 (lst Cir. 1940). The court was making reference to the
Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1959).
8. 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for a unanimous court
said that Erie is "inapplicable to these areas of judicial decision within which the
policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations
which they affect must be deemed governed by federal- law having its source in
those statutes, rather than by local law."
9. 141 F.2d 411, 416 (4th Cir. 1944). The court said, "The control of bank-
ruptcy funds, like the right of the federal government to issue checks, is based
upon the Constitution and the laws of the United States. The rights and liabilities
with respect to handling of such funds 'find their roots in the same federal sources';
and 'in absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.'"
10. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
11. 163 F.2d 286, 288 (1st Cir. 1947). See also Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406 (1953); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) ; Panama Agencies Co. v. Franco,
111 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1940).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, "Congress shall have the Power ... to make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper . . . ."; art. III, § 2, "The judicial
power shall extend . . . - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . .. ."
13. Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law,
64 HARV. L. Riv. 246, 268 (1950).
14. The maritime cases to which Erie does not apply are certainly not precedent.
This case is not predicated upon a maritime tort. See Chambers v. Just, 113 F.2d
105, 108 (5th Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 668 (1941) ; Holmes v.
0. & C. Ry., 5 Fed. 75, 77 (D. Ore. 1880), aff'd on rehearing, 9 Fed. 229 (C.C.
Ore. 1881). It does not arise from a maritime contract. See Belfast v. Boon, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 266 (1869); Berwind - White Coal Mining Co. v. City of New York,
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The fact that one of the contracting parties in this case was a
seaman appears to have been material to the court's decision. Since
courts have traditionally maintained a policy of treating seamen as wards
of the admiralty, 15 and since their rights to recover for personal injury
are usually governed by the general maritime law and the Jones Act,' 6
it is not illogical to determine the validity of the contracts made in pur-
suit of these rights by a similarly universal standard. But since the
seaman was not a party to this action and had no rights at issue, such a
rationale does not appear to validly extend to the question of whether
there was an interference with the contract.17 Further, the wording of
Judge Wyzanski's opinion indicates that perhaps the chief concern was
in the fact that plaintiff was an officer of a federal court and that inter-
ference with a contract under which he pursued a federal cause of action
in a federal court should be governed by uniform national law.' 8 This
rationale applies not only to the question of the validity of the contract
but also to whether there was an interference with that contract. 19 Such
reasoning must stand upon its own merits, however, since although
there are no express repudiations of it, 'in existing cases concerning third
party interference with the attorney-client relationship, courts in diversity
jurisdiction have looked to state law for guidance.2 0 If the true basis for
135 F.2d 443, 446 (2d Cir. 1943). And it is not a libel in admiralty. But see,
Collins v. Nickerson, 6 Fed. Cas. 133 (No. 3017) (D. Mass. 1846); Angell v.
Bennett, 1 Fed. Cas. 39 (No. 387) (D. Mass. 1844). In these cases it was held
that a proctor, who had commenced a suit for a seaman, may proceed in it for
costs after a clandestine settlement by defendant with proctor's client. Under this
theory, plaintiff Greenberg could have proceeded to recover his costs in the libel
originally filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. But
this adds no admiralty aspect to the instant case.
Further, this case involves no substantial relation to any national commercial
interest. See text accompanying note 9, supra. It would appear ingenuous to assert
that this right of action for interference with a contract relation is, in itself, "based
upon the Constitution and the laws of the United States." See text accompanying
notes 7 & 8, supra.
15. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 246, 251 (1942); Harden
v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, 485 (No. 6047) (C.C. Me. 1823).
16. 41 Stat. 988 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 861 (1959).
17. In a situation such as this case, it would not seem realistic to find the con-
tract invalid when the seaman is a party to the action and valid simply because he
is not a party to the action. It follows then that this reasoning should apply to
the question of contract validity even though the seaman is not a party, but it
does not follow that the same reasoning must apply to all other issues concerning the
contract.
18. Greenberg v. Panama Transport Co., 185 F. Supp. 320, 324-25 (D. Mass.
1960), "The controlling principles of substantive law should be enunciated on a
national basis applicable to anyone who is said to have interfered with a pro-
fessional relation between an officer of a national court and his client."
19. Id. at 324, "Every policy consideration dictates that the federal courts
should enunciate uniform national rules to determine the validity of contracts made
by proctors in admiralty, *,ho are officers of federal courts, to present claims to
federal courts." The court did not specify the policy considerations to which it
referred.
20. Employer Liability Assur. Corp. v. Freeman, 229 F.2d 547, 549 (10th Cir.
1955); State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 184 F.2d 447, 448 (4th Cir. 1950).
Courts have even applied state law where the alleged interference has been such
that it could result in the attorney being disbarred before a federal court. French
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 88 F. Supp. 714, 721 (D. N.J. 1950).
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this opinion is concern for a lawyer operating as an officer of a federal
court, 21 the instant case is open to extensive application. Apparently, if
an attorney-client contract contemplates a suit based upon a federal cause
of action in a federal court it will be governed by federal law. It is further
conceivable that this rationale could extend to the situation where there
is a federal cause of action and a possibility of suit in a federal court or
where an action brought in a state court is removed to a federal court. 22
It is submitted that such extensions are unwarranted and not intended
by the court. The more likely view is that it was the factual combination
of an officer of a federal court and a traditionally court protected seamen
entering into a contract, the subject matter of which was federal in nature,
that prompted the court to this decision. If this analysis is correct perhaps
the instant case should be applied to only the most similar of fact situa-
tions where these essential elements are present. 23
James L. McHugh, Jr.
21. Perhaps, because this suit involves a contract made by a Spanish national
there are other reasons for not subjecting the issues to state law. If state law
were applied Spanish national A might have a valid contract in one state while
Spanish national B's identical contract in Maine might be invalid. But if this is
the sole rationale, then any foreign national involved in any action with a United
States citizen should be able to avail himself of uniform national law merely
because he is not a United States citizen. Such protection is not given to an
American citizen when he enters any of the several states' courts or the federal
district courts.
There is also a strong doubt as to the validity of the retainer contract under
Maine law. Massachusetts courts would determine the validity and interpretation
of a contract by application of the law of the state in which it was executed.
Hazeltine Research Inc. v. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 77 F. Supp. 493, 496 (D.
Mass. 1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 827 (1950). Be-
cause of its contingent fee and mention of suit, Maine may have branded the
contract champertous. Mz. Rxv. SrAT. ANN. c. 135, § 18 (1954). Cases decided
under this statute are not clear as to whether it would apply to a contract con-
templating a tort action. Hinckley v. Giberson, 129 Me. 308, 151 Atl. 542 (1930);
Orino v. Belveau, 120 Me. 550, 113 At]. 260 (1921); Manning v. Perkins, 85 Me.
172, 26 Atl. 1015 (1892) ; Burnham v. Heselton, 84 Me. 578, 24 Atl. 955 (1892).
22. In these situations, this case may be valid authority for determining con-
tract interference, but to apply it in determining the contract's validity may amount
to basing that validity upon the subsequent acts of a party or subsequent acts of
one not even a party.
23. Thus it seems that, rather than being one of the traditional situations where
Erie does not apply because of underlying principles of federal law, this case is
not governed by Erie because of the nature of the relationship established by the
contract. Indeed, Judge Wyzanski implies federal law applies to these facts whether
the suit is brought in a federal or a state court. Greenberg v. Panama Transport Co.,
185 F. Supp. 320, 324 (D. Mass. 1960).
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INTERNAL REVENUE-DEPLETION-COMPUTATION OF GROSS
INCOME PERCENTAGE BY MINER-MANUFACTURER.
United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co. (U.S. 1960).
Respondent, an Indiana corporation, engaged during the tax year
1951 in the production of fire clay and shale from an underground mine.
These minerals were transported to respondent's plant where they were
processed and manufactured into vitrified sewer pipe and related burnt
clay products. Respondent brought this action to recover federal income
taxes paid in 1951. It asserted that it was entitled to a percentage de-
pletion allowance under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,1 and that
such allowance should be based on the gross income from its finished
vitrified products, which it claimed as its first "commercially marketable
product or products."'2 The government contended that an established local
market existed for raw fire clay and shale, and that the allowance should
be computed on the hypothetical or ,constructive income which respondent
would have grossed on its raw minerals at the prevailing local market
rate. The district court found that, while a local market did exist for the
raw minerals, the peculiarities of respondent's operations 3 made it im-
possible for it to market such products profitably.4 It held that they were
not therefore, "commercially marketable," and ruled for respondent. 5 The
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(m), 53 Stat. 12 (now INT. Rgv. CODE OF
1954, § 611(a)), provides: "In computing net income there shall be allowed as
deductions: . . . (m). Depletion. In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other
natural deposits, and timber a reasonable allowance for depletion . . . according
to the peculiar conditions in each case ... ." Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 114(b)
(4), 53 Stat. 45, as amended, ch. 521, § 319, 65 Stat. 497 (1951) (now INT. REv.
CODE or 1954, § 613(a)), provides: "The allowance for depletion under 23(m)
in the case of mines and other natural deposits shall be - (i) in the case of . . .
shale ...5 per centum, .. . (iii) in the case of ... fire clay .. . 15 per centum,
... of the gross income from the property during the taxable year ... "
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 4, § 114(b) (4), added by ch. 63, § 124(c),
58 Stat. 45 (1944) (now INT. RiV. CODE OF 1954, § 613(c)), provides: "As used
in this paragraph the term "gross income from the property" means the gross in-
come from mining. The term "mining" as used herein shall be considered to
include not merely the extraction of the ores or minerals from the ground but
also the ordinary treatment processes normally applied by mine owners and operators
in order to obtain the commercially marketable product or products .... 1"
3. Principally the fact that respondent operated an underground mine rather
than a strip mine.
4. The pertinent findings of fact, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows: (1) that over 300,000 short tons of fire clay (of some 500,000 short tons
produced) were sold in the raw form in Indiana in 1951, and that raw fire clay
and shale were also sold during the same period in the neighboring regions of
Kentucky; (2) that the bulk of these sales were made at Brazil, Indiana, some
one hundred and forty miles from respondent's plant at Cannelton, Indiana; (3)
that the average price for the raw minerals at Brazil ranged from $1.60 to $1.90
per ton; and (4) that respondent's mining costs amounted to $2.41 per ton exclu-
sive of subsequent transportation costs. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co. v. United States,
268 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1959).
5. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co. v. United States, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R. 5277
(S.D. Ind. 1958).
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court of appeals affirmed.6 On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court reversed, and held that the statutory phrase "commercially mar-
ketable" must be construed as establishing an industry-wide standard, and
that the test of commercial marketability is, therefore, the availability of an
existing market for the product in question and not the ability of a par-
ticular producer to compete profitably in that market. United States v.
Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1581 (1960).
The percentage depletion allowance was introduced into the national
tax structure by the Internal Revenue Code of 1926, 7 by which Congress
granted the deduction to oil and gas producers. Since that time, it has
been steadily extended to the producers of all minerals.8 The essence of the
congressional policy is to permit mine owners and operators to deduct a
fixed percentage of the gross income of their mineral producing prop-
erties as an allowance for the consumption of capital assets, and thereby
to encourage such producers to explore and develop further mineral de-
posits.9 Congress adopted the percentage depletion system in order to
provide a simple and practical method of computing the allowance, and
thus avoid the complexities of the older cost depletion and discovery
depletion methods.1 0 It was not until 1943 that Congress acted to eliminate
the ambiguity of the phrase "gross income from the property" by defining
it as "gross income from mining," and by adding the definition of mining
upon which the instant case turns.1 It was held in 1954 that the phrase
''commercially marketable product or products" must be construed to mean
the first such product arrived at (or the first such products, as a single
mining operation may yield a number of such basic products). 12 The
much noted case of United States v. Cherokee Brick and Tile Co.,"3 de-
cided in 1955, held that where no substantial market existed for a raw
mineral, it was not "commercially marketable," and that a producer could
continue to process it until he arrived at a marketable product; he could
compute his depletion allowance on gross income from his final product, the
only limitation on the producer being that his processes must be those
6. 268 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1959).
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1926, ch. 27, § 204(c) (2), 44 Stat. 16 (now INT. REV.
CODE oF 1954, § 613(b) (1)).
8. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 611(a), 613(a), (b). The scope of the per-
centage depletion system is such as to make the instant case and similar litigations of
major economic significance to both the government and the mining industry.
9. This underlying purpose has been consistently emphasized by the courts.
See e.g. United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1581 (1960);
Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); United States v. Dragon Cement
Co., 244 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 833 (1957) ; United States
v. Merry Brothers Brick and Tile Co., 242 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 824 (1957).
10. See 4 MERTENS, LAW or FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 24.03(c).
11. See note 2 supra.
12. Black Mountain Corp., 21 T.C. 746 (1954).
13. 218 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1955). Taxpayer, as in instant case, was an integrated
miner-manufacturer of burnt clay products from raw clay. The government conceded
that there was only a negligible market for raw clay, but contended that taxpayer's
processes were of a manufacturing nature and consequently not "ordinary" processes
in the statutory sense.
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"normally applied by mine owners and operators"14 in the industry in-
volved. The court thus rejected the government's contention that the
allowance should not extend to any increment in the product's value
obtained by a "manufacturing" rather than a "mining" process. The
same court subsequently reaffirmed its repudiation of the manufacturing-
mining distinction, 15 and it has been supported in this by every other court
which has considered the question.' The principal of Cherokee would
seem, therefore, to be a firmly established rule. The government in the
instant case has abandoned its attempt to draw the above distinction and
has attacked the related question of what constitutes a commercially
marketable product. The decisions of the lower courts in this case, and in
several other recent cases, 17 have sought to carry the Cherokee rule one
step further by holding that a product is not commercially marketable,
even though a market for it exists, if its producer can not sell it profitably
in that market. By this decision, the Supreme Court has rejected this
test of "profitability" or "economic feasibility."
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the instant case leaves the
holdings in Cherokee and the other "ordinary treatment processes" cases
wholly untouched. A fundamental new rule on a distinct point has been
laid down, the chief objection to which is that a product which cannot be
profitably sold is hardly marketable commercially, as the latter term is
generally understood, even though it may be marketable.' 8 There are,
however, powerful countervailing arguments. It must be remembered that
the basic purpose of percentage depletion is to allow for the exhaustion
of wasting assets; it is not to allow for the cost of either recovery or
processing of minerals.' 9 The long legislative history of the percentage
depletion method reveals a continuing congressional understanding that the
depletable value of a given quantity of mineral is its value in its raw form
when there is a market for it in that form.2 0 To permit computation of the
14. See note 2 supra.
15. United States v. Merry Bros. Brick & Tile Co., 242 F.2d 708 (5th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957).
16. United States v. Dragon Cement Co., 244 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied
355 U.S. 833 (1957) ; United States v. Sapulpa Brick & Tile Co., 239 F.2d 694 (10th
Cir. 1956); Townshend v. Hitchcock Corp., 232 F.2d 444 (4th Cir. 1956). All of
these cases are essentially similar in that there was concededly no substantial market
for the raw mineral and that the government based its case on the theory that
"manufacturing" processes are extraordinary per se in the mining industry.
17. Commissioner v. Iowa Limestone Co., 269 F.2d 398 (8th Cir., 1959); Book-
walter v. Centropolis Crusher Co., 272 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1959) ; Standard Clay
Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Pa. 1959) ; Sparta
Ceramic Co. v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ohio 1958) ; Riverton Lime
& Stone Co., 28 T.C. 446 (1957). It is arguable that the first two cases, supra,
involving producers of chemical grade limestone, are distinguishable from the in-
stant case, in that the code treats chemical grade limestone as a mineral distinct,
for depletion purposes, from building or agricultural limestone.
18. This point is well made in Sparta Ceramic Co. v. United States, 168 F.
Supp. 401, 404 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
19. See note 9 supra. See also 4 MtRTtNS, LAW ol FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION,
§ 24.02.
20. When Congress extended the deduction to oil and gas producers in 1926,
"gross income from the property" was described as "gross receipts from the sale of
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allowance on the increment in value produced by processing beyond that
point would be, in effect, to subsidize the processing of minerals, a result
clearly not contemplated by Congress. There is furthermore, no evidence
of congressional intent to give some members of an extractive industry an
advantage over others in the matter of depletion, and this would be the
necessary result of an individualized standard of profitability which ad-
justed to every peculiar or inefficient mining operation. 2 1 The congressional
choice of the words "the ordinary treatment processes normally applied
by mine owners and operators" reinforce the Court's conclusion that the
proper standard of commercial marketability is the industry-wide test of
market availability, rather than the individualized test of profitability.
The recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code22 for the most part
eliminated the Cannelton Pipe difficulty by expressly defining the term
"mining." It would seem that future litigation, although necessarily con-
fined to problems involving processing prior to January 1, 1961, the
effective date of the amendments, will in all likelihood be concerned chiefly
with such problems as the availability of a market, 23 and definition of the
phrase, "ordinary treatment process." It would appear that the govern-
ment's former contention that "manufacturing" processes are extraordinary
per se will no longer be urged. 24
John J. Cannon
oil and gas as it was delivered from the property," JOINT COMMITTEE ON INT. REv.
TAXATION, 69TH CONGRESS, PRELIMINARY REPORT, Vol. 1, Part 2 (1927). It is
reasonable to assume that Congress was guided by the same concept of "gross income
from the property" in its successive extensions of the percentage depletion system.
This is supported by the language of Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 114(b) (4) (B) : "The
term ordinary treatment processes, as used herein, shall include the following: (i) in
the case of coal .. . (ii) in the case of sulphur .. . (iii) in the case of iron ore ...
and minerals which are customarily sold in the form of a crude mineral product
sorting, concentrating, and sintering to bring to shipping grade and form, and loading
for shipment .... The fact findings of the District Court, note 4 supra, clearly show
that fire clay and shale were customarily sold as crude mineral products in Indiana.
21. The individualized standard urged by respondent' would certainly tend to
give a competitive advantage to less efficient producers. The less efficient a given
operation is, the more processing will be required to produce a profitably marketable
product, and the larger will be the depletion allowance. Such a standard would
also, of course, favor an integrated miner-manufacturer such as respondent over a
non-integrated mining operation.
22. In the instant case the principal center of market activity was one hundred
and forty miles from respondent's plant, but what if it had been one thousand miles
away? At what point can a market reasonably be said to be available to a particular
producer? In view of the present holding, this is a problem with which the courts
will certainly have to deal.
23. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 613(c) (4), as amended by P.L. 86-564, § 302(b).
24. See, Rev. Rul. 60-320, 1960 INT. REv. BULL. No. 41, at 13.
[VOL. 6
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1960], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss1/5
